Abstract-There has been much debate over the past few decades regarding the implementation of an Australian high-speed rail (HSR) system along the nation's eastern seaboard. The cost of building such infrastructure has meant that Australian governments have been reluctant to pursue its development. Changing contextual circumstances, such as the likelihood of an Australian emissions trading scheme, concerns about peak oil, restrictions on airport capacity and the desirability of enhancing transport infrastructure, have added impetus to the call for an Australian HSR system. The magnitude of the investment required implies that a wide range of public-private relationships would be necessary for the network's construction and management. This paper draws on international experiences relating to the arrangements between government funders of HSR projects and service providers contracted to provide HSR services. This review analyses the contractual issues that need to be addressed in any future infrastructure development with respect to HSR and examines the extent to which international contractual arrangements are able to provide insights into the relationship between funding the construction of these assets and their management in an Australian context.
I. INTRODUCTION
ustralia does not have a HSR system capable of 250 km/h plus speeds that can compete with air transport and private automobiles. An HSR system has the potential to provide an important transport network between capital cities on the eastern seaboard of the continent (e.g., MelbourneCanberra-Sydney-Newcastle-Brisbane). According to HSR proponents, changing contextual factors make the opportunity for HSR more attractive than has previously been the case [1] , particularly as an alternative to more carbon-intensive air transport. Australia's current federal government (Commonwealth) pursuing an ambitious program to overhaul national infrastructure policy. In early 2008, the Commonwealth established Infrastructure Australia 1 as a means to drive the development of a long-term, coordinated national approach to infrastructure planning and investment. Private investors are increasingly prepared to help bankroll the Commonwealth's ambitious AUD200 billion infrastructure agenda [2] , which covers water, energy, communications, health, education, housing and transport. A modest AUD1 to 2.4 billion has been earmarked for national and interstate rail projects [3, 4] .
Although an Australian HSR system represents an opportunity for world-class transport infrastructure, work is needed to ascertain its economic, social and environmental feasibility. Previous Australian HSR project evaluations are now dated, especially since they were conceived in a political and social context that placed less emphasis on sustainability. This paper focuses on procuring HSR investment through contracting strategies, notably public-private-partnerships (PPPs). First, it distinguishes different infrastructure outsourcing arrangements; second, it introduces the Australian context for infrastructure outsourcing in general and for rail transport, in particular; third, the history of HSR in Australia is briefly recapped, before the paper draws on lessons from international HSR experiences that have adopted a PPP arrangement for the provision of infrastructure and services. Conclusions for the funding of new HSR infrastructure in Australia are also provided.
II. INFRASTRUCTURE OUTSOURCING ARRANGEMENTS AND PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS
Governments have used private contractors to provide public services over a long period of time [5] . More recently, partnerships between governments and private contractors have become a feature of 'new public management' (NPM) which has radically altered public administration processes across OECD countries [6] . Economy, efficiency and effectiveness or value for money (VFM) in service provision have been major reform drivers [7] . New infrastructure-based outsourcing arrangements exist along a spectrum of public to private investment responsibility, as shown in Table 1 immediately below: Source: Adapted from [8, 9] Common to all PPPs is an arrangement whereby a private consortium contracts with a public sector agency to finance, design and construct a facility under a time and cost-specific contract. Following the construction undertaken and financed by the consortium, services are provided under a long-term contract. A revenue stream is used to repay debt, fund operations, deliver contracted services, and provide a return to investors. Payments are not made until the asset is commissioned and becomes fully operational [8] [9] [10] . In addition to the conventional forms (e.g., DBO/M and BOO/T), a variety of innovative delivery models have been developed to address various challenges posed to some PPPs. These new hybrid forms are special purpose vehicles (SPV) or institutional PPPs, a term used to distinguish them from the 'concessional' or 'contractual' PPP. Hybrid forms include joint ventures 2 and alliances. 3 Overall, these arrangements are particularly suited to complex and innovative projects that cannot be easily defined beforehand, and in which the parameters are relatively dynamic and subject to ongoing negotiation between stakeholders [9] . These infrastructure delivery options are based on the premise that private provision offers superior savings to consumers, governments and the taxpayer. Therefore, before a PPP scheme can be approved, it must be demonstrated (using the Public Sector Comparator [PSC] construct) that the deal will save money when compared to the publicly financed alternative.
III. PPPS IN AUSTRALIA
Australia ranks just behind the world's PPP leader, the United Kingdom (UK), based on the characteristics of PPP sophistication and activity [8] . Australian PPPs have been used for the delivery of projects across a broad range of public service functions including hospitals, prisons, schools, utilities, and transport. Between 1980 to 2005, 127 PPPs worth AUD35 billion have been used for the delivery of infrastructure projects [7] . More recently, plans for a National Broadband Network -one of Infrastructure Australia's seven national infrastructure priorities -have been announced by the federal government [11] . While initial stages of the eight-year AUD43 billion project will be financed and coordinated by the federal government, subsequent stages are dependent on private sector involvement.
The state of Victoria has led PPP initiatives since the 1990s [6] . The establishment of Partnerships Victoria within the Victorian Department of Treasury and Finance in 2000 marked a watershed in PPP implementation and development in Australia [7] . Victoria began developing a suite of comprehensive PPP-specific steering mechanisms based on the UK's private finance initiative (PFI) model. This model established a set of procedures to govern the pre-contractual decision-making stage, which leads to the signing of a PPP contract and establishes the oversight mechanisms employed in the project's construction and operation. PPP policies in other jurisdictions have been largely based on the established Victorian policies. In 2005, the federal and all state governments formally agreed to harmonize their approach to PPP development and implementation.
Two distinct PPP models are recognized in Australia, both of which are characterized by different payment scenarios based on service demand [7, 10] . The first PPP model has been in use since 2000 and resembles the UK's PFI model. In these arrangements (also known as 'social' PPPs), the government assumes demand risk, guarantees a minimum revenue stream, and pays directly for service provision. Under the second model (known as 'economic' PPPs), revenue risk is transferred to the consortium. It typically involves a 'user-pays' structure for the use by the public of facilities, such as roads and bridges. Governments may effectively underwrite an agreed real rate of return on investment through terms and undertakings so as to minimize existing and future competitive options, thereby ensuring that revenues cover the asset's cost [7] . In Australia, a variety of hybrid models are used to capture different demand and risk scenarios and project types [7, 10] . The need for independent inquiry (performance audits) into PPP arrangements is recognized [12] . Noteworthy, too, is that the post-2000 focus on VFM outcomes in the context of steering mechanisms (as opposed to the procurement of off-balance sheet assets) appears to indicate that most Australian PPP assets may be recognized on government balance sheets [7] .
Though it is difficult to draw conclusions about observed PPP project allocations, PPPs are more likely to flourish in circumstances that are i) not highly politically charged, ii) where risk can easily be transferred to the private sector, and iii) where private consortiums are provided with relative certainty of achieving desired returns [7] . In addition, governments need to be convinced that the political risks of a PPP can be managed. This is more important than trying to win over the community, which will accept the PPP model and the user-pays principle if the project delivers [2] . projects and 51% of funding was in the transport sector. Road projects (mostly toll roads) were worth twice as much (34%) as rail projects (17%), while rail projects were mostly related to maintenance and infrastructure upgrades [7] . These differences stem mainly from the fact that new railway infrastructure, in terms of its technology, is far more complex than a toll way [13] . However, the private sector's appetite for road or rail PPPs is limited. The uptake of PPPs will depend on whether the global financial crisis has eased sufficiently for the private sector to absorb risk. Private investors might also require some temporary measures (e.g., government guarantees) before they enter the market [2] . The lack of nationally consistent PPP strategies and policies has also frustrated many private sector participants [14, 15] , and has resulted in poor infrastructure outcomes [16] . The broader implication for rail transport is that PPP models are an appropriate model of funding HSR projects, and the new Australian national PPP policy and guidelines go some way toward addressing this [10] . Yet it is unlikely that a contractual arrangement will address the complicated arrangements required of a complex public infrastructure negotiation such as an HSR system. PPPs require a balancing of both contractual and relationship issues (e.g., trust) to approach projects in a spirit of partnership [17] .
IV. RAIL TRANSPORT IN AUSTRALIA
Australian cities are widely regarded as one of the poorest achievers with regard to public transport [18] . Cities with poor public transport systems, especially passenger rail systems, have higher total costs of transport as a proportion of city wealth; for instance, 13.8% in Australia compared with 8.1% in Europe [18] . Rail has played a dominant role in moving bulk primary commodities to Australia's ports and processing centres, as well as moving intercity freight. That said, there are number of deficiencies with Australian rail freight, including lack of long-term vision, poor rail line-haul performance, inadequate capital investment, and the inability of supply chain participants to optimize efficiency through better coordination [19] . Despite recent improvements, rail continues to struggle to maintain its share of freight tasks in key corridors. On the whole, different approaches by the Commonwealth to determine funding and charging regimes for rail versus road have resulted in a lack of competitive neutrality, together with rail deficits, particularly in urban passenger services. These continuing deficits mean that much of government expenditure is diverted from necessary capital works to offsetting ongoing financial losses and retirement of debt [20] .
To date, the Commonwealth has not supported a 'centrally-planned' approach since this is viewed as 'dictating national transport development' [21] . Rather, the view is that target performance levels needed to be agreed to by all state and territory jurisdictions so as to provide certainty for planning. However, many in the industry are deeply frustrated at the lack of effective Commonwealth and state cooperation [20] . Given the relatively small proportion of federal funding made available for rail investments, the Commonwealth is interested in encouraging and utilizing private sector investment in rail infrastructure investments in lieu of public funding. Paradoxically, the current lack of consistency in management and government regulation of the rail system is seen as a major impediment to private investment [21] . Some progress has been made in reforming the industry (e.g., improved access arrangements and harmonization of accreditation), yet more far-reaching reforms are necessary if rail is to reach its potential [19-21, 22]. The Infrastructure Australia reform initiative offers further hope for rail, with three of the seven national infrastructure priorities relating to rail transport [23]:
• Competitive international gateways by developing more effective ports and associated land transport systems.
• A national rail freight network.
• Increasing public transport capacity in cities and making better use of existing transport infrastructure.
The notable absence of new intercity rail transport from the current Government's priorities for infrastructure reform, suggests that the impetus, funding and responsibility for such an initiative needs to be found primarily in the private sector. Government-funded PPPs may therefore need to give way to private-based PPPs. Superannuation funds looking for a safe investment may be asked to invest in these PPPs [2, 16] .
V. HSR IN AUSTRALIA

A. Background
The first fully-fledged proposal for an advanced passenger railway operation between Melbourne-Canberra-Sydney emerged in 1990 from a private HSR consortium comprising BHP, TNT, Elders IXL and Japan's Kumagai Gumi [24] . The partners promoted the scheme as a private sector venture, subject to special taxation arrangements recognizing the long pay-back periods associated with major infrastructure projects. In August 1991, Federal Cabinet rejected the consortium's taxation concession proposals and the venture folded [25] . In 1993, plans for a new Sydney-Canberra line re-emerged from the Speedrail consortium, which comprised an engineering consultancy, project managers, and Anglo-French company GEC-Alstom. Some particular terms of the Commonwealth's brief were that governments be protected from financial and operational risk and that 'there be no net cost to taxpayers' [13] . By end of 2000, this project also faltered. Speedrail claimed that its requirements for clear and unchanging approval processes, straightforward regulations and endorsed standards for the construction and operation of HSR did not exist. The government claimed that the proposal did not meet the test of 'at no net cost to the taxpayer', the prevailing government mantra with respect to HSR in Australia. This is contrary to international experience, where government has been heavily involved in the provision and operation of HSR [26] . Furthermore, the policy position taken by all governments concerned was that no direct public 978-1-4244-5791-5/09/$25.00 © 2009 IEEE funding should be expected for the project [25] . It is unclear whether the various jurisdictions involved would have yielded to Speedrail's request to provide financial input for the resumption of private land and the construction of two platforms. Finally, a 2001 scoping study for an east-coast HSR has also been shelved [13] , while an AUD59 billion fast-track HSR project to link Melbourne-Canberra-Sydney has also been mooted [27] . Instead, the Commonwealth appears to favour an east-coast inland rail freight corridor [3, 28] .
Clearly, a wide range of important issues bear on HSR proposals, including land acquisition and compensation for land-owners, infrastructure requirements, land use and access, economic and employment impacts, community amenity and social impacts, in addition to environmental issues [25] . As a result, none of the above proposals could have proved commercially viable without significant public sector funding contribution, or other forms of financial concession [13] . The costs and risks would be of such magnitude and construction and operation of such a scale that HSR could only have been achieved through the leadership of the Commonwealth and state governments working closely together. Government funding contributions to an Australian HSR have been estimated at between 60% to 100% [13] , depending on required rates of return on private sector equity, costs, demand and perceived risks. Under strong government leadership, there would be many opportunities for private-public cooperation and partnerships to deliver and possibly operate elements of the project [13] . Given Infrastructure Australia's freshly articulated priorities, it is unlikely that the Commonwealth's position will change significantly in the near future. It is therefore uncertain whether an innovative PPP arrangement can be constructed so as to deliver a successful HSR system.
B. Future
Although PPP arrangements have become more prevalent in Australia over the past decade, their application and subsequent management continues to provide significant challenges. In particular, the limited quantity of empirical research that has focused on PPP initiatives [9] ensures that the many contractual issues arising during the course of a project have yet to be fully realized. In the context of the possibility of an Australian HSR system, these challenges are further stressed by the addition of unique project complexities. Examples of such complexities include the lengthy project time-frame, the application of advanced technologies, and the large number of stakeholder interests.
Without the benefit of empirical research, further understanding of the various contractual issues associated with PPP arrangements for HSR projects may be possible through secondary assessment of the literature. In view of this, the following section represents an initial effort to identify and examine several key contractual issues that apply to the Australian HSR context.
VI. LESSONS FROM INTERNATIONAL HSR PROJECTS
A number of issues directly influence the success or failure of PPPs [6] [7] [8] . Four key issues pertinent to the introduction of a HSR system in Australia emerge from a review of four international HSR projects, these being: i) late involvement of private parties; ii) lengthy procurement processes; iii) political interference and renegotiating of contracts; and iv) dealing with representative bodies and stakeholders.
A. Netherlands
HSL-Zuid -a 125-km-long high-speed line between the Netherlands and Belgium -is the largest PPP so far undertaken in the Netherlands. The project concessionaire, the Infraspeed consortium, is responsible for the design, building, operation, finance and maintenance of all track equipment for a period of 25 years until 2030 [29] . This PPP provides an extreme example of splitting the various production components into individual contracts [29] . Problems arose as a result of from conflict between the contractors responsible for civil engineering projects and Infraspeed [30] . This conflict stemmed from the unequal entry of both parties to the project, and the subsequent separation of closely-linked infrastructure components. Infraspeed based its project bid on civil engineering designs contracted up to two years earlier; but, during the course of Infraspeed's bid assessment, those plans were refined, thereby prompting various design anomalies between both parties. Although pro-active management of the contractual interfaces overcame many of the problems [31] , the need to integrate each of the separate construction components along the route was identified as a key learning outcome [30] . Complete resolution of this timing issue may be impracticable given the nature of PPPs. In particular, it is recognized that governments generally set the project conditions up front, something which restricts the involvement of private parties in early project stages [9] .
B. Sweden
When government knowledge of HSR systems and technologies is limited, long delays in the procurement process may occur. Such was the case with Sweden's HSR, the X2000, which was constructed in the mid-1980s. Although the green light was initially given in the late 1960s, actual development took almost two decades [32] . Reasons for this were attributed to the procurement phase. More specifically, significant delays occurred while members of the government-led project team sought to acquire the necessary level of competency that would allow them to negotiate credibly with foreign bidders [32] . Although Australia has a notable history of HSR assessment and discussion, as highlighted earlier in this paper, no project to date has progressed beyond the preliminary proposal stages. As the Swedish HSR example illustrates, gaining an appropriate level of expert knowledge in all areas of product procurement is essential. Indeed, the decision to move from a 978-1-4244-5791-5/09/$25.00 © 2009 IEEE project proposal stage to official commissioning may be dependent on this key criterion.
C. Eurotunnel
Eurotunnel provides the opportunity to analyse issues of contract disputes and renegotiations. The problem of significant underestimations by Eurotunnel contractors and the general inadequacy of contractual cost controls has been highlighted elsewhere [33] . These issues contributed greatly to substantial budgetary overruns and scheduling delays. Additional expense claims by the contract consortium, TransManche Link (TML), points to the desperate consequence of contractual disputes for projects of this nature. In 1992, TML made a claim for additional construction costs amounting to GBP1.5. This claim was unable to be dealt with effectively by the disputes panel specifically set up for such issues. As a result, the matter was heard by a higher arbitration tribunal. In the meantime, delays to the project schedule negatively affected Eurotunnel's ability to raise much needed equity for future production and service costs [33] . Although unfavourable budgetary outcomes have been attributed to the underestimations of project tasks undertaken by TML, government interference with the project is well documented. This behaviour can be classified as a type of manifest political risk [9] . In the case of Eurotunnel, this took the form of the French and UK governments imposing additional safety requirements during construction. A similar scenario occurred with HSL-Zuid, whereby additional safety measures were considered necessary following several European tunnel disasters [30] . Any HSR proponent must be cautioned against uncoordinated government interference in the development and operation of PPPs [9] and the possible risk of jurifidication (regulatory inflation) when it comes to enforcing long-term contracts [34] .
D. France
In terms of managing multiple representative bodies associated with an HSR project, the French TGV Méditerranée [35] highlights the potential for project delay arising from conflict among elected government officials. This is especially noteworthy given that large-scale infrastructure projects, especially those associated with HSR, are always highly politicized. Such conflict is to be expected given the mandate to protect and pursue the interests of their respective constituents. For this reason, dialogue between stakeholders in the early stages of project development is advised, together with the establishment of a third-party disputes panel to resolve protracted disputes [35] . As the case of Eurotunnel demonstrates, such mediation is no guarantee that the affected parties will not take their case to arbitration, a course of action which inevitably results in significant project delays.
VII. CONCLUSION
With a track record in PPPs in non-rail sectors, new national guidelines for PPPs, Commonwealth government funding for national infrastructure and growing pressure for modern, environmentally friendly interstate transport systems, the time for a PPP to deliver an Australian HSR network may be approaching. Before any HSR project -be it privately and/or publicly funded, proposed by government, or unsolicited -can proceed, at least two further conditions identified by a rail transport inquiry ten years ago [20] still need to met: i) a stronger recognition by the federal and state governments of their responsibility to provide public use rail infrastructure of an adequate standard; and ii) the development of a national, strategic and integrated approach to transport planning. There is ample international evidence to show that, contrary to previous expectations on the part of Australian governments, there is a need for the taxpayer to bear at least part of the cost of any HSR project. Public funding has proved a key element in the success of HSR projects, beginning with Japan's Shinkansen and perhaps best exemplified by the France's TGV. In the Australian context, an HSR system almost certainly cannot be a fully private-funded exercise. A PPP arrangement therefore constitutes the best means to ensure an equitable spread of risk between public and private interests.
